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Higher-order evidence is evidence about what’s rational to think in light of your
evidence. Many have argued that it’s special—falling into its own evidential category,
or leading to deviations from standard rational norms. But it’s not. Given standard
assumptions, almost all evidence is (in part) higher-order evidence.
Higher-order evidence is in vogue. But what it is—let alone what its effects are—is hotly
contested.
Two classes of positions are relevant here. First, some have claimed or presupposed
that your evidence about a given proposition can be “factored” into two different bodies of
evidence—your first-order evidence, and your higher-order evidence.1 Second, some have
argued that in cases involving higher-order evidence, standard epistemological norms (like
probabilism and conditionalization) break down.2
Here we make a simple point that casts doubt on both of these positions: given natural
assumptions, almost all evidence is (in part) higher-order evidence. More precisely: given
that there’s a correlation between evidence and truth, and given the symmetry of proba-
bilistic relevance, almost all evidence should affect your beliefs about what opinions were
supported by your (initial) evidence. This suggests both that there can be no clean di-
vide between first- and higher-order evidence, and that those who reject standard norms
in cases of higher-order evidence must say—implausibly—that those norms fail in almost
every case.
We first give our argument (§1), then go on to defend each premise (§2), and finally
draw out some of the consequences of our conclusion (§3).
1 The Argument
First, an example. Here’s what you know: there are wood-shavings on the floor of Roger’s
office. How much does this initial evidence support the claim that (C:) Roger does wood-
Carving in his office? Presumably you should be unsure. Maybe (S:) it strongly supports
∗Authors contributed equally.
1E.g. Feldman (2005); Christensen (2010, 2016); Horowitz (2014); Schoenfield (2015, 2018); Sliwa and
Horowitz (2015).
2E.g. Christensen (2007a, 2010); Henderson (2021); Brössel and Eder (2014); Schoenfield (2018); Gallow
(2021), and perhaps Sliwa and Horowitz (2015) and Elkin and Wheeler (2018).
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the claim that he does (what else could generate wood-shavings?); but maybe it doesn’t
(perhaps wood-shavings could’ve come in on his boots). So you should be unsure about
whether or not S is true, i.e. whether your initial evidence strongly supports the claim
that Roger carves in his office.
What if you were to learn that your initial evidence does strongly support that claim?
(It’s hard for wood-shavings to stick to boots.) That should boost your confidence that
he carves in his office: P (C|S) > P (C). For C is exactly what you’d expect if S is true.
But remember: hypotheses that should lead you to (more strongly) expect that C is true
are themselves confirmed when you learn that C is true. S is such a hypothesis. Thus
learning C (that Roger carves in his office) should also boost your confidence in S (that
your initial evidence strongly supported this claim): P (S|C) > P (S). More precisely, this
follows from the symmetry of probabilistic relevance.3 Since we know that learning that
your (initial) evidence strongly supported C should boost your confidence in C—i.e. that
P (C|S) > P (C)—it follows that learning C should boost your confidence that your initial
evidence strongly supported C: P (S|C) > P (S). And that’s just to say that C provides
evidence about S, i.e. provides (higher-order) evidence about how strongly your initial
evidence supported C.
The subtle step in this reasoning is the appeal to the symmetry of probabilistic rele-
vance. To make this more intuitive, consider an analogy in a familiar setting: coin flips.
You know that a coin is about to be flipped, but you’re unsure both about whether (H:) it’ll
land Heads, and about whether (B:) it’s Biased toward heads. (Uncertainty about the bias
is analogous to uncertainty about the strength of your initial evidence.)
What if you were to learn that it was biased toward heads? That should boost your
confidence that it’ll land heads: P (H|B) > P (H). For H is exactly what you’d expect if
B is true. But remember: hypotheses that should lead you to (more strongly) expect that
H is true are themselves confirmed when you learn that H is true. B is such a hypothesis.
Thus learning H (that the coin landed heads) should also boost your confidence in B (that
it was biased toward heads): P (B|H) > P (B). This should be familiar: obviously the way
to get evidence about whether a coin is biased toward heads is to flip it and see if it lands
heads. The reason this provides evidence is, again, due to the symmetry of probabilistic
relevance: since learning it’s biased should boost your confidence in H, learning that H
should boost your confidence that it’s biased.
Likewise with Roger: since learning that your initial evidence strongly supported C
should boost your confidence in C, learning that C should boost your confidence that
your initial evidence strongly supported C.
Now onto the general argument. A clarification: The example just given was framed
in diachronic terms; we talked about how you should change your confidence in a claim
upon learning a hypothesis. But this can get confusing—we want to talk about what your
evidence supports, and as you learn things your evidence changes. Thus in what follows
we’ll frame things in synchronic terms, in terms of your unconditional and conditional
credences at a given (initial) time. Nevertheless, we’ll still talk about some new claim E
(which you don’t yet know) being evidence about H in the sense that learning E would
3By the ratio formula, P (C|S) > P (C) iff P (C∧S)
P (S)
> P (C) iff
P (C∧S)
P (C)
> P (S) iff P (S|C) > P (S).
2
help you figure out whether H.
Clarification made, the crucial parts of our argument are (a) that it can be rational to
be uncertain what your evidence supports, and (b) that what your evidence supports is
correlated with truth. We’ll assume that we can model your rational degrees of belief given
your evidence (standards of reasoning, etc.) with a unique, precise probability function
P .4 ‘P ’ is a definite description: ‘the rational credence function I should have, given my
current evidence (standards of reasoning, etc.)’.
Our first premise is a sufficient condition for one thing being evidence about5 another:
P1) If your credence in X given q should differ from your credence in X, then q is evidence
about X.
I.e. if P (X|q) 6= P (X), then q is evidence about X.
Our second premise is a sufficient condition for a claim being higher-order evidence:
P2) If q is evidence about the opinion you should have in p given your current evidence,
then q is (in part) higher-order evidence about p.
Our third premise is that, typically, it’s rational to have at least some higher-order un-
certainty concerning a given proposition q. That is, it’s rational to be unsure what is the
exact rational credence for you to have in q:
P3) Typically, it’s rational to be uncertain of the rational credence in q.
I.e. typically, for all t, P (P (q) = t) < 1.
Our final premise is a way of making precise the idea that evidence is correlated with truth.
In particular, the claim that your evidence supports confidence in q provides evidence in
favor of q:
P4) Typically, q is more likely to be true if your evidence supports it than if it doesn’t.
I.e. typically, for all t, P (q|P (q) ≥ t) > P (q|P (q) < t) (if both are well-defined).6
From (P1)–(P4), it follows that:
C) Evidence is typically higher-order evidence.
Here’s why.
Consider some possible piece of evidence q, and suppose we are in a typical case. The
opinion you should have about q, given your current evidence, is P (q). It follows from
(P1) and (P2) that if your credences about the value of P (q) should be different on the
supposition that q than without this supposition, then q is higher-order evidence about
4See e.g. White (2005); Schoenfield (2014, 2019); Schultheis (2018) on uniqueness and Seidenfeld and
Wasserman (1993); White (2009a); Joyce (2010); Carr (2020) on precision.
5As always, claims about what’s evidence for what must be understood as relative to some (implicit)
background information—we’ll take this background to be your current rational credence function P .
6Technically, our argument only requires the weaker premise that there is some t such that
P (q|P (q) ≥ t) > P (q|P (q) < t), since we only need to show that there is some proposition of the form
[P (q) ≥ t] such that P (P (q) ≥ t|q) 6= P (P (q) ≥ t). Nevertheless, we think the stronger premise is well-
motivated and plausible, since denying it would imply that there’s a threshold at which evidential support
is anti-correlated (or uncorrelated) with truth, i.e. that P (q|P (q) ≥ t) ≤ P (q|P (q) < t). See footnote 10.
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q—for example, if for some t, P (P (q) ≥ t|q) 6= P (P (q) ≥ t), then q is higher-order evidence
about q. We’ll show that this is so.
Since we are in a typical case, (P3) tells us that you should be uncertain of the rational
credence in q—thus there is a t such that both P (P (q) ≥ t) > 0 and P (P (q) < t) > 0. It
follows that both P (q|P (q) ≥ t) and P (q|P (q) < t) are well-defined, and so by (P4), the
former is greater than the latter:
P (q|P (q) ≥ t) > P (q|P (q) < t)
Since by total probability P (q) is a weighted average of (and thus in between) P (q|P (q) ≥ t)
and P (q|P (q) < t), it follows that the claim that your current evidence supports confidence
in q (i.e. P (q) ≥ t) is evidence for q:
P (q|P (q) ≥ t) > P (q)
By the symmetry of probabilistic relevance, it thereby follows that q is evidence for your
current evidence supports confidence in q:
P (P (q) ≥ t|q) > P (P (q) ≥ t)
But this means that q should change your credence about the value of P (q), and so—by
our above consequence of (P1) and (P2)—that q is higher-order evidence about q.
2 The Defense
We’ll now defend each premise. The first two should be uncontroversial. (P1) follows from
standard Bayesian conceptions of evidence. It is widely held that q is evidence for X if
and only if P (X | q) > P (X). Some theorists reject the left-to-right (‘only if’) part this
claim because of the problem of old evidence, but they still agree with the right-to-left
direction.7 And all these theorists would, we think, agree that if P (X | q) 6= P (X), then
q is evidence about X.
(P2) is a plausible sufficient condition for evidence to be higher-order. After all, higher-
order evidence is supposed to be evidence about your evidence—hence the name (Chris-
tensen, 2010). So even if other cases can count as well8, surely if you get evidence about
how confident your evidence should make you, that counts as (at least in part) higher-
order evidence. We think all epistemologists can accept this, even if they disagree about
how you ought to respond to higher-order evidence.
The last two premises are slightly more controversial. (P3) says that you typically ought
to be uncertain of what credence you ought to have in a proposition q.9 Two considerations
support this claim. First, you typically ought to be uncertain about what your evidence
is. For instance, suppose your evidence consists of all and only the propositions that
7In response to this problem, Joyce (2005) holds that q is evidence for X if and only if P (X | q) >
P (X | ¬q). But this still entails that if P (X | q) > P (X), then q is evidence for (and hence about) X.
8E.g. some focus on evidence about your reliability, in various senses (Elga, 2007; Christensen, 2007b;
Roush, 2009, 2016; White, 2009b; Schoenfield, 2015, 2018; Isaacs, 2019).
9For defenses, see Williamson (2000, 2008); Lasonen-Aarnio (2013); Roush (2016); Dorst (2019).
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you know. Arguably, you can know a proposition but fail to know that you know it
(Williamson, 2000). And unarguably, you can fail to know a proposition (because it’s
false) without knowing that you fail to know it (because you have no reason to suspect
that it’s false). Assuming that such failures are typical, you will typically be rationally
uncertain about what your evidence is, and therefore uncertain about what credences you
ought to have. One can resist this argument only by defending a conception of evidence
for which both positive introspection and negative introspection typically hold—that if a
proposition is (not) part of your evidence, then your evidence includes the fact that it’s
(not) part of your evidence. We think the prospects for such a conception of evidence are
dim (but see Salow, 2019). Second, you typically ought to be uncertain about what your
evidence supports. For instance, you can and should be uncertain about what theoretical
virtues there are and how exactly they should be traded off against each other to determine
overall evidential support. That is, you can and should be uncertain just how much weight
should be given to simplicity versus elegance versus fit with the data, and so on.
One might dispute (P3) by holding (i) that facts about evidential support relations are
necessary and (ii) that (ideally) rational agents are certain of all necessary truths. While
(i) is plausible, (ii) is not. Ideally rational agents might have unlimited memories and
computational speeds, but there is little reason to think that these cognitive capacities
would enable you to be rationally certain of all necessary truths, especially of some such
necessary truths, such as the fact that water is H2O. One might respond that fundamental
facts about evidential support are a priori, just like fundamental facts about ethics. But
while these domains may be a priori in the sense that many facts therein are knowable a
priori, this does not mean that all facts in these domains are knowable a priori. Some may
not be knowable at all, for instance because they are too precise for us to latch onto safely.
More generally, it is implausible that even ideally rational agents would be certain of the
exact degree to which any given body of evidence supports any given hypothesis. Our
uncertainty about just how much weight to give to simplicity versus elegance versus fit is
not due to our finite computational speed or finite memory, but rather due to our ignorance
about the exact strengths of the reasons corresponding to each of these theoretical virtues.
(P4) encapsulates the idea that evidence is correlated with truth. Typically, a proposi-
tion is more likely to be true if it’s supported by your evidence (to above some threshold)
than if it isn’t. Relatedly, it captures the idea that you should be guided by your take
on the evidence. This premise may be rejected by some extreme ‘level-splitters’ who hold
that your rational credences about the degree to which your evidence supports a propo-
sition usually have no bearing on what credence you ought to have in that proposition
(Lasonen-Aarnio, 2015; Weatherson, 2019). But among those who hold that the former
do—at least typically—have some bearing on the latter, (P4) is common ground.10
10Dorst (2020) explicitly argues for (P4), showing that it follows from the Value of Evidence (Good,
1967). Hedden (2019) argues for a similar conclusion, and many other authors voice sympathy for the
basic idea, e.g. Conee (1992, 667), Williamson (2000, 202), White (2006, 539), Sliwa and Horowitz (2015,
2846), Horowitz (2019, 107).
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3 The Upshots
We’ll close with two upshots. The first concerns the distinction between first-order and
higher-order evidence. It’s tempting to think that your total evidence can be divided into
two disjoint categories, one consisting of all your first-order evidence and the other con-
sisting of all your higher-order evidence.11 But this doesn’t work. Suppose your evidence
includes the proposition that you recently ingested a reason-distorting drug (Christensen,
2010). Is that proposition part of your first-order evidence or part of your higher-order ev-
idence? The question has a false presupposition, namely that all pieces of evidence count
as first-order or higher-order (but not both) tout court. This proposition is first-order
evidence concerning the hypothesis that your reasoning is distorted, but it is higher-order
evidence concerning, say, the hypothesis that your share of the dinner bill is $43—a con-
clusion you reached on the basis of reasoning that you now have grounds to distrust.
This suggests that while we might be unable to divide your evidence into two disjoint
categories—first-order and higher-order—tout court, we might be able to divide your ev-
idence into these two disjoint categories relative to a given hypothesis. We could say, for
any hypothesis H, that these propositions are your first-order evidence about H, while
those other ones are your higher-order evidence about H. And one proposition could be
first-order relative to one hypothesis but higher-order relative to another.
If our argument is right, then this proposal is also mistaken. For any given hypothesis
can—in fact, usually does—count as both first-order and higher-order evidence relative to
itself. The proposition q is maximally strong first-order evidence for q, by virtue of entailing
it. But q is also (typically) higher-order evidence about q, by virtue of constituting evidence
about how strongly your (initial) evidence supported q.
Perhaps instead we should distinguish between first-order and higher-order routes or
paths of evidential support (Christensen, 2019). We shouldn’t speak, in the first instance,
of propositions counting as first-order or higher-order evidence (even relative to a given
hypothesis). Rather, we should speak of paths from an evidence proposition to a hypothesis
as being first-order or higher-order. These paths could be represented using directed
graphs. To a first approximation, an evidential support path from q to h is higher-order
if it goes via a proposition concerning the degree to which your evidence supports h, and
it is first-order otherwise. Sometimes, a piece of evidence bears on a hypothesis in a first-
order way. Sometimes it bears on a hypothesis in a higher-order way. But sometimes, it
bears on a hypothesis in both a first-order way and a higher-order way. This will be the
case if there is both an evidential support path from q to h which goes via a proposition
concerning the degree to which your evidence supports q, and also an evidential support
path from q to h which does not go through such an intermediate proposition and is thus
more direct. In a slogan: it’s paths of evidential support, not propositions, that can be
categorized as first-order or higher-order.
Second upshot: several authors have argued that in the context of higher-order evi-
dence, standard rational norms break down or run into dilemmas. Christensen (2007a)
and Henderson (2021) argue that such cases tell against (precise) probabilism (cf. Elkin
11See e.g., Schoenfield (2015, 426), who writes, ‘I’ll use the term “first-order evidence” to refer to any
evidence you have that is not higher-order evidence.’
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and Wheeler, 2018). Meanwhile, Christensen (2010), Brössel and Eder (2014), Schoenfield
(2018), and Gallow (2021) argue that such cases should lead rational agents to deviate from
conditionalization. If we’re right, then these arguments risk over-generalizing—showing
that probabilism and conditionalization are almost never rational norms. That seems like
an implausible verdict. Thus, at the very least, authors who defend such views must be
very clear on the sense of ‘higher-order evidence’ that is meant to warrant such devia-
tions from standard rational norms, and explain why the above sufficient condition for
higher-order evidence is not within their intended target.
In sum: higher-order evidence is everywhere. Because of this, we should be cautious
about proposals that claim that you should respond to it in a distinctive way from how
you should respond to evidence generally.12
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